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In this paper the structure of the rural economy in Armenia is explored from a household 
perspective. The paper draws on the livelihoods framework, recognizing the different 
capitals and activities that support rural households￿ livelihood strategies. Ownership of 
capitals and access to activities are examined in relation to the incidence of poverty on the 
basis of data from a recent large-scale survey of rural households in Armenia. Different 
measures for the outcome of livelihood strategies in terms of well-being are observed, which 
are consistently linked to income levels across poor and other households. Income-poor 
households are found to be less well-endowed especially with financial and social capital. 
They derive smaller income shares from economic activities, and more from dissaving and 
social payments. The findings are relevant to policies aimed at alleviating rural poverty. 
 





The transition of many formerly communist countries towards a market economy has had 
mixed economic effects. On one hand, it introduced freedom of enterprise and of trade, 
allowed a wider choice of consumption goods, and shifted the focus from production 
volumes to increasing efficiency in production; on the other, in all transition countries 
unemployment, inequality and poverty have sharply increased and industries have collapsed 
without sufficient development of new sectors. Particularly in the former Soviet republics in 
the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia, which relied heavily on trans-Soviet linkages prior to 
1991, the pain of transition has often outweighed its economic gains so far. Market reforms 
are typically incomplete, the regional infrastructure has broken down, and poverty levels are 
often high (Milanovic, 1998; UNDP, 1999). Given the importance of agriculture and the 
generally high proportion of the population living in rural areas in these regions (EBRD, 
2002), there is a need for ￿developing long-term strategies for improving food security, 
alleviating poverty and encouraging sound use of natural resources￿ (Babu and Tashmatov, 
1999). Such strategies are predicated on an adequate understanding of the structure of the 
rural economy. 
  The present study explores and explains the structure of the rural economy in 
Armenia on the basis of data from a recent large-scale household survey (Lerman and 
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Mirzakhanian, 2001). Conceptually, it draws on the livelihoods approach (Ellis, 2000), 
focusing on the portfolio of households￿ economic activities, and the results of that diversity 
of activities in terms of income and other measures for well-being. This appears to be an 
appropriate method for investigating rural household behaviour in post-communist societies, 
where both income levels and income sources have changed dramatically over the last 
decade. 
  In line with this approach, the exploration of survey findings focuses on the 
households￿ endowment of capitals (natural, physical, financial, human, and social) in section 
5; the economic activities in which the households employ these assets (section 6); and the 
level of well-being, measured in various ways, that households are capable of attaining in 
their livelihood strategies (section 7). Section 8 makes a formal connection between 
livelihood components, well-being and poverty by analysing the risk of being poor with a 
logistic regression model. Section 9 concludes. Before analysing the survey data, we present 
an outline of the livelihoods framework in the next section, background information on 
Armenia in transition in section 3, and an introduction to the data in section 4. 
 
 
2. Livelihoods, Diversity and Well-being 
 
This paper is structured around the concepts of livelihood and diversity. ￿A livelihood 
comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and 
the access gained to these ￿ that together determine the living gained by ￿ the household￿ 
(Ellis, 2000:10). Thus, the unit of study is the household. Assets form households￿ 
endowment of resources with which to gain their living. In this definition, the conventional 
meaning of assets is expanded to include, besides material and financial resources, also 
household members￿ skills and experience (human capital), their relations within wider 
communities (social capital), and their natural environment (natural capital). Assets are 
combined with economic activities (wage employment, entrepreneurship, migration labour, 
etc.) to result in a household￿s livelihood. A livelihood thus comprises a household￿s ￿means 
to a living￿, or its strategy to attain a level of material well-being, reflected in income, 
consumption, satisfaction, health and longevity, and other measures. 
  The second central term in this paper is diversity, which follows naturally from the 
idea of livelihood. Diversity in a household￿s activities and income ￿refers to the existence, at 
a point in time, of ￿ different household income sources￿￿ (Ellis, 2000:14). Households￿ 
incomes normally derive from more than one source: income diversification is the norm, 
specialisation the exception (Barrett et al, 2001). This recognition corrects the conventional 
portrayal of rural households as depending on farm income, which in fact is but one of 
potentially many income sources. 
Typically, household income diversity is especially large in rural areas. Rural 
households are often producers as well as consumers, which implies the presence of profit 
(from sold output) and in-kind income (if output is consumed) as household income 
components in addition to, for instance, wages. Also, the gap between urban and rural 
incomes (Rauch, 1993), the urban bias in economic development and the more limited 
market development that often characterises rural areas (Gruever and Zeager, 1990) make it 
less likely that any single source of income is sufficient to meet rural household needs. 
  For similar reasons, income diversity is particularly relevant to developing 
economies. There is a growing awareness that the traditional approach equating rural areas 
with agriculture in much development thinking is, and probably always was, false. Rural   3 
households in Africa derive up to 40-45 % of their income from non-agricultural sources; in 
developing Asia this is about 30 %, in Latin America 40 % (Haggblade et al, 2002). More 
recently also rural diversity in the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union has received attention from academics and the international 
institutions (Csaki and Tuck, 2000; Csaki and Lerman, 2001; EBRD, 2002; Spoor, 2003). 
 
 
3. Armenia during Transition 
 
Armenia is the smallest former Soviet republic outside the Baltic States. It is a mountainous 
country of less than 30,000 sq. km located in the Trans-Caucasus, bordering Turkey, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Its population is 3.1 million, with another 5 million 
Armenians living outside the state territory (EBRD, 2002). 
  During the Soviet era, Armenia was an industrialised country with a large rural 
population. The market-oriented reforms introduced in 1991-92 comprised the privatisation 
of many productive resources and organisations, a large degree of liberalisation of trade and 
prices, and decentralisation of economic decision-making. Importantly for the rural 
economy, Armenia was one of the few former Soviet Republics to privatise agriculture 
effectively and swiftly during 1991-92: the bulk of cultivable land and agricultural output is 
now in small family farms (Lerman and Mirzakhanian, 2001). The macroeconomic and 
structural reforms led to a severe economic contraction, but growth resumed as early as 
1994. By 1993, GDP had declined to 47 percent of its 1990 level, and then gradually 
recovered to 68 percent in 2000. Agricultural output, on the other hand, did not register any 
significant declines during transition, remaining stable during 1990-97 and increasing 
afterwards to 113 percent of the 1990 level (CIS, 2001). This is an exception to the strong 
downward trends observed in all former Soviet republics, and it is probably attributable to 
the swift and decisive transition to individual farming in 1992. As a result of these 
differential trends in the growth behaviour of agriculture and the economy as a whole, the 
share of agriculture in GDP rose from 17% in 1990 to 29% in 1999, while agricultural 
employment increased from 17% of the labour force in 1990 to more than 40% in 1999. In 
absolute numbers, agricultural labour nearly doubled between 1990 and 1999 as labour-
intensive individual agriculture attracted workers from depressed urban areas (CIS, 2001). 
During the last decade of the 20th century, Armenia thus transformed from an industrialised 
state to one that is to a significant degree agrarian. 
  In addition to the shock of system change from central planning to a market 
economy, natural disasters and a military conflict contributed to a sharp decrease in welfare. 
In 1988, Armenia experienced an earthquake affecting 40 percent of its territory and a third 
of its population. In 1990-94, it was involved in a territorial war with Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabagh and absorbed a large inflow of refugees. In 1997 a severe drought 
followed. Per capita levels of income sank by nearly 60% during the initial economic decline, 
dropping (in constant 1995 dollars) from US$1,500 in 1990 to US$620 in 1992 (MinFin, 
2000). Subsequently incomes increased to US$940 in 1999, still nearly 40% below the 1990 
level (WDI, 2002). In 1999, 43 % of the population was below a poverty line of US$2.15 per 
person per day at 1995 PPP. This compares to 19 % in Russia and Georgia and 24 % in 
Azerbaijan (World Bank, 2000). Poverty is not predominantly rural. Using a relative poverty 
line, the ratio of rural poverty to urban poverty incidence is 0.9 (Csaki and Tuck, 2000). This 
is plausibly due to the widespread availability of land outside the cities: consumption of own-  4 
produced food accounts for 43 % of rural incomes, but is reportedly absent in urban 
incomes (EBRD, 2002).  
Table 1 summarises some key economic changes during the transition.  
 
Table 1: Armenia in Transition: Key Economic Indicators 
Indicators 1990  1999-2000 
    
Population (million)  3.7  3.1 
Emigration (million)    0.9 (1991-2001) 
Rural population, %  30  33 
GDP (index)  100  68 
Agricultural output (index)  100  113 
Agricultural employment (persons)  275,400  560,400 
Share of agriculture     
  ... in GDP, %  17  29 
   ... in employment, %  17  43 
GNP per capita (constant 1995 dollars)  1,475  943 
Incidence of poverty, % of population     
  ... below $2.15 per day (1995 PPP)  NA  43 
  ... below $4.30 per day (1995 PPP)  NA  86 
Food consumption, calories per person per day  1,809 (1992)  1,944 (2000) 
Sources: population and emigration: EBRD (2002), based on the 2001 census; GNP per capita: WDI (2002); 
incidence of poverty: Csaki and Tuck (2000) based on 1996 LSMS survey; food consumption: FAOSTAT 
database; all other data: CIS (2001) 
 
 
4. The Data 
 
The empirical basis of this study is a large and representative survey of rural households in 
Armenia, implemented in 1998 by the World Bank￿s Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development Unit (see Lerman and Mirzakhanian (2001) for details). The survey 
covered 75 villages and 7,000 people in 1,500 households. This is 9 % of all villages and 0.5 
percent of all Armenian rural (more precisely: land-owning) households. Data were collected 
in all 11 provinces, within which villages were selected randomly. In each village, 20 
households were surveyed so as to reach a 1,500 household sample size. The survey was 
focused on land-owning households since one of its aims was to collect data on the 
country￿s agricultural sector. However, with the widespread land ownership that 
characterises rural Armenia, this did not significantly bias the survey￿s representation of rural 
households in general. The map shows Armenia’s geography and the location of the villages 
in the survey. 
 
<Map: The 1998 Household Survey: Geographical Frame> 
 
Data collected in the sample comprised household demographics, education and 
labour market data, detailed land and food production data, and information on the use and 
effects of irrigation networks, on savings and credit, on non-farm activities, and on 
households￿ experiences during crises. An overview of findings is provided in Lerman and 
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5. Capitals  
 
In this section the nature and quantities of the ￿five capitals￿ that underpin households￿ 
livelihoods is explored for the Armenian survey sample. These capitals include natural, 
physical, human, financial, and social capital (Ellis, 2000), and we examine differences in 
endowments between ￿poor￿ and ￿non-poor￿ households. Unless otherwise specified, 
households are classified into poor and non-poor based on the $4.30 poverty line. Based on 
this poverty line, the Armenian rural sample included 63 % of poor and 37 % of non-poor 
respondents. 
  
Natural capital  
Armenia is a mountainous country, and most of the agricultural land is uncultivable, 
consisting of mountain pastures and hay meadows. The country is divided into two 
extremely unequal parts: the narrow strip of the Ararat Valley at an average altitude of 800-
1,000 m, which extends along the Turkish border from northwest to southeast and includes 
the capital city of Yerevan; and the rest of the country, which is mostly mountains with 
occasional deep valleys (average altitude 1,500-3,000 m). Nearly half the country￿s population 
live in the Ararat Valley and, without Yerevan, this region accounts for 28% of the rural 
population.  
  The Ararat Valley has the most fertile soils in Armenia. It includes nearly half the 
Armenian area under vineyards and orchards and about 10% of all arable land; it produces 
about 40% of the country￿s agricultural output. Its climate is hot and arid. With less than 300 
mm annual rainfall and average maximum temperatures above 38 degrees centigrade, 
agriculture in the Ararat Valley is highly dependent on irrigation with water supplied from 
several local rivers (Atlas, 1984). This geographical difference in natural capital endowment is 
only weakly reflected in poverty figures. In the survey samples from the three provinces of 
the Ararat Valley, the average share of households below the poverty lines of $4.30 per 
person per day and $2.15 per person per day (1995 PPP) are 65 % and 30 %, respectively. In 
the other eight provinces, the average poverty incidence is 66 % and 35 %, respectively (only 
the difference based on the $2.15 poverty line is statistically significant at p = 0.05). 
  
Physical capital 
Rural households￿ main productive physical asset is land. As a result of the land distribution 
policies in the early 1990s, 97 % of households in the sample own land and 15 % lease 
additional land. Only 2 % have no access to land. The average household uses 1.9 hectares, 
an average reflecting a rather equitable distribution, with a standard deviation of 1.7 hectares. 
There is no difference in land use between poor households and other households. 
  In Armenia￿s dry climate, irrigation is an important asset in agricultural production. 
Production value per land unit in the 55 % of households with access to the irrigation 
network is three times higher than is the case for households without irrigation. Households 
that use irrigation work smaller areas of land (1.4 hectares, of which 0.7 hectares is irrigated) 
and tend to specialise more in production of fruit and vegetables. Households without 
irrigation have larger plots (3.2 hectares) and derive a larger share of farm income from 
livestock production; within crop production, their emphasis is more on staples (mainly 
cereals) and fodder crops. These households produce more agricultural output in value 
terms, but the net household income derived from it is lower due to higher costs connected 
to livestock production. Poor households (those below the $4.30 poverty line) have access to 
less irrigated land (0.35 hectare on average) than non-poor households (0.44 hectare).   6 
  A third component of physical capital is households￿ stock of animals, which 
constitutes the main asset in livestock production. The typical household in the sample has 
one cow, one other head of cattle, a few sheep or goats, and some chickens. Poor 
households have fewer animals; for instance, 0.7 head of cattle compared to 0.9 for non-
poor households. 
  Finally, ownership of machinery is rare: only 14 % of households own one or several 
pieces of equipment, such as tractors, trucks, cultivators, seeders, or combines; in 4 % of 
households ownership is joint with other households. In contrast, access to machinery 
through use without ownership is available to 75 % of households, with no significant 
differences between poor and non-poor households. This points to the importance of 
machinery rental markets for agricultural production. The overall picture is that of rural 
households with small-scale farms producing both crops and livestock products and with 
quite equal access to the various types of physical capital. 
 
Human Capital 
A household￿s human capital is comprised of those individual characteristics of its members, 
both qualitative and quantitative, that help them to generate income. The main 
characteristics of human capital are age, education, gender, and household size. The average 
head of household is 54 years of age; the average age of all household members is 35. The 
average household has a size of 4.6 persons, of which 2.8 are of working age between 16 and 
65; half (53 %) of them are women. Poor households are significantly larger (5.0 members 
on average) and have more dependants; their average dependency ratio ￿ defined as the 
share of household members younger or older than working age (16-65 years) ￿ is 0.41, 
compared to 0.36 for non-poor households. 
The highest level of education completed in the household is most often secondary; 
women having slightly more often general secondary education, men more often vocational 
secondary education. In a fifth of the households no primary school education was 
completed by any of the household members, but adult illiteracy is virtually absent. 
Interestingly, poor households are on average slightly, but statistically significantly better 
educated than non-poor households. 
  One other dimension of human capital is the presence of a household member 
eligible for receiving a pension in the household. Having a pensioner in the household 
implies access to an important source of income and can be consistently (if not 
conventionally) viewed as part of a household￿s human capital. Half the households in this 
sample included one or more pensioners. Poor households less often so (in 48 % of 
households) than non-poor households (54 %) 
 
Financial capital  
Sources of financial capital include household savings, borrowing, and receiving remittances 
from family members working outside the home village (within or outside of Armenia). Only 
10% of households had any cash savings, while borrowing is reported by the majority of 
households: 50 % borrowed in 1997, and 65 % of households had outstanding debt in 1998. 
Poor households are slightly more often borrowers (54 % borrowed in 1997, compared to 
48 % of non-poor households), much less often savers (5 % compared to 18 %). They also 
receive less often remittances (15 % of poor households, compared to 31 % of the non-
poor). Although receiving remittances is quite frequent (20 % of households have access to 
them) and they appear to have a poverty-alleviating effect, remittances are relatively 
unimportant in total household incomes (4 % of it on average).   7 
  Loans taken out in 1997 were predominantly obtained on the informal market. 
Mostly this was from relatives and friends (for 84 % of households reporting debt) or from 
private moneylenders (13 %). Only in six cases was this bank credit. Debts varied between 
50,000 and 390,000 dram, averaging 170,000 dram, which amounts to just under a third of 
average annual household income of 509,000 dram (see Table 3, note 7). No interest was 
reported on any of the loans, and collateral was involved only in 8 % of the cases. Loans 
were most frequently used to pay land tax, water charges, and debts to other households, 
which were reported as loan use by 82 %, 49 % and 30 % of borrowing households, 
respectively. 
  The picture that emerges from these figures is that of a rural economy with an active, 
but almost exclusively informal financial market providing small interest-free and 
uncollateralized loans to households. A plausible motivation for these loan transactions 
between households may be pooling of scarce financial resources in order to meet tax 
obligations to the authorities and ongoing debt obligations to private parties. 
  
Social Capital 
Social capital may be defined as ￿the ability of actor to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or social structures￿ (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1998). 
Various proxies for social capital were observed in the survey data. First, membership in a 
professional agricultural organisation was reported by 7 % of households, with no significant 
differences between the poor and non-poor. Second, nearly half (43%) of the households 
reported co-operation in some farming-related area, most often in irrigation (27 % of 
households), followed by joint use of machinery and equipment (9%) and joint sale of 
products or professional consultation (9%). Virtually no co-operation was reported in 
production, processing, or input purchasing. Non-poor households significantly more often 
(in 55 % of cases) engaged in co-operation than poor households (37 %). 
  A third measure for social capital that is highly relevant in Armenia is the incidence 
of mutual help in hard times, which may reduce households￿ vulnerability to shocks 
(Dudwick, 2003). Unsurprisingly in view of Armenia￿s recent history of drought, earthquake, 
and political violence, about 45 % of respondents reported they had experienced a serious 
economic crisis that had endangered the well-being of their family in the last 5 years. About 
a fifth (21 %) of these households had received help from relatives during and after the 
crisis, 5 % had received help from others (a state agency, charitable organization, or church). 
However, 73 % had received no help at all. Households were also asked to report whom 
they could rely on for help if they were now struck by ￿a major crop failure, massive livestock 
deaths, or some other type of major crisis￿. If such an event were to occur, households 
expected to rely for assistance most frequently, in 48 % of responses, on close relatives, 
friends, and neighbours. Only a tenth would expect assistance from some state or private 
institution (village or regional administration, NGO, moneylender or insurance company). 
The rest (42%) did not expect to receive help. The higher figures for expected help than for 
actual assistance in the past suggest that either respondents overestimate their ability to rely 
on help from outside the household, or that such networks of assistance have become more 
widespread, perhaps in response to recent hardships. Poor households reported significantly 
less often (in 53 % of cases, compared to 64 % of the non-poor) that they expected to have 
access to such help. 
  We now turn to the other elements of the livelihoods framework: households￿ 
economic activities, and the incomes and levels of well-being that households attain based 
on their capital endowments and engagement in economic activities.   8 
6. Diversity in Activities and Incomes 
 
A household￿s portfolio of economic activities can be measured either by studying its 
allocation of resources (mainly labour) to different activities, or in terms of household 
income shares. Tables 2 and 3 present household labour allocated to various economic 
activities and shares of total household income derived from them. 
  The main economic activity in this rural household survey is food production by 
farming the own plot, most often in the areas of both crops and livestock. Over four-fifths 
of the available labour force in the average rural household is engaged in farming, and this 
activity is reported by nearly all households (Table 2). The second most frequent activity (for 
43 % of households) is non-agricultural self-employment, but the amount of labour allocated 
to this is quite low. Off-farm wage employment is nearly as frequent: in 36 % of households, 
one or several household members are employed off-farm. However, on average more than 
twice as much labour is allocated to off-farm wage employment compared to self-
employment. Most frequently (12 %), wage employment is in the social sector, which 
probably reflects the large presence of aid, relief and development NGOs in Armenia.  
While households on average allocate three-quarters of their labour to agriculture, 
the activity portfolios are even more diversified at the individual level. Of all 4,178 working-
age individuals (16-65 years of age) in the sample, only a small minority of 20 % (870 
individuals) report full-time employment in agriculture.  
Table 3 presents an alternative measure of diversity, which is the structure of 
household income. Consistently with the relatively large allocation of labour to farming, 
food production is the dominant source of household income (see column A). Yet income 
other than from farming accounts for 38 % of household income on average. Most of this 
non-farming income is derived from off-farm wages and social payments, and the 
contribution of other sources is of limited importance.  
The last two columns in Table 3 (B and C) show the frequency of various sources of 
income in the survey and the contribution of each source to the total income of respondents 
reporting income from that particular source. Over 60 % of households in the sample rely 
on social payments for a fifth of their incomes on average. Nearly 40 % of households 
report income from wages, which account for a quarter of total income for this group of 
respondents. A worrying feature in Table 3 is the 18 % of households who derived over a 
fifth of their 1997 incomes from sale of assets. Sale of household asses appears to be a 
survival strategy for the poor (Dudwick, 2003). Indeed, poor households in the sample 
(below the $4.30 poverty line) derived 5 % of household income from this source, compared 
to only 2 % for non-poor households (the sample mean for this source is 4% of total income 
￿ see Table 3).  
  Income-poor households were found to be significantly less often engaged in 
economic activities compared to non-poor households. Of all income-poor households 
(defined by the $4.30 poverty line), self-employment in non-farm or non-agricultural 
activities was reported by 34 % (compared to 51 % of the non-poor) and wage employment 
was reported by 36 % (compared to 44 % of the non-poor). 
From a livelihoods perspective the figures in Tables 2 and 3 show that rural Armenia 
does not fully overlap with Armenia￿s farm sector. Nearly a fifth of labour is allocated in the 
average household to off-farm activities, in either waged jobs or self-employment; and non-
farm sources other than social payment provide a quarter of total household income. There 
are pronounced differences in participation in economic activities between poor and non-
poor households.   9 
Table 2: Household Labour Allocation 
 
Occupational categories 
% of households 
allocating labour to 
this category 
Labour in full-time 
average labour 
equivalents1 
Labour in % of household 
labour time 
Working on own farm  82.3  1.87  82 
Employed in waged job:  36.4  0.28  12 
￿ in agriculture  7.7  0.05  2 
￿ in industry  8.3  0.05  2 
￿ in trade  3.3  0.02  0 
￿ in social sector  12.0  0.08  4 
￿ in other state employment  11.1 0.08  4 
Self-employed outside primary 
agriculture  42.5 0.12  5 
Total n.a.  2.27  100 
Note: Figures are indicative rather than precise and do not take account of household members employed 
outside of the locality in (temporary) migration activities. 
1. Full time equivalents (fte￿s) of labour were constructed by equating full time employment to 1.0 fte and part-
time or occasional employment to 0.5 fte. 
Source: Survey findings 
 
Table 3: Structure of Household Incomes 
 
Source of income 
A. 
Average contribution 
to total income (%) 
B. 
% of households with 
income from this source 
C. 
Income share for households 
in B (100*A/B) 
Food production1  62 96  64 
Salaries  10 39  26 
Social payments2  13 61  21 
Asset sales3  4 18  22 
Remittances4  4 20  20 
Other on-farm activities5  4 26  16 
Non-farm activities6  3 15  20 
Total household income7  100    
Notes: Incomes are defined as revenues from an activity minus any costs.  Activities which carry costs (food 
production and other on-farm or non-farm production) can therefore be negative.  
1.  Income from food production includes in-kind income, i.e. food produced by the household and then 
bartered or consumed by the household, valued at regional prices for 12 crop products and 8 livestock 
products and reported costs in 15 categories. 
2.  Social payments include pensions, allowances, stipends, scholarships, alimony, and humanitarian assistance 
from institutions and friends or relatives. 
3.  Asset sales include sales of household items, such as jewellery and carpets and of land and buildings. 
4.  Remittances include contributions to household income both from within Armenia (8 % of households) 
and from abroad (12 % of households). 
5.  Other on-farm activities include the sale of live animals, renting out land or equipment, providing farm 
services, processing of farm products, and sale of food. 
6.  Non-farm activities include providing occasional labour, crafts and small-scale industry, trade and 
commerce, and provision of consumer services (hairdressing, shoe repair, appliance repair and 
maintenance, etc.). 
7.  Average total household income is 509,189 dram annually, or $5,702 at 1995 PPP of 89.3 dram to the 
dollar (WDI, 2002). 
Source: Survey findings 
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7. Incomes and Well-Being 
 
Having reviewed households￿ capitals and diversified activities, we now turn to the levels of 
well-being that these livelihood components allow households to achieve. The level and 
distribution of several measures for well-being were observed in the sample, including 
incomes, expenditures, consumption, satisfaction of basic needs (nutrition and shelter), and 
households￿ capacity for wealth accumulation. 
  Incomes comprise both cash and in-kind income (which is food produced and 
consumed by the farm household). With a share of on average 56 % of on-farm food 
production consumed by the farm family, in-kind income accounted for 60 % of total 
household income of 509,000 dram in the sample. At the 1995 PPP exchange rate of 89.3 
dram per international dollar (WDI, 2002), the average household income in the sample 
(both cash and in kind) was $5,702 in 1997. This translates to per-capita annual income of 
$1,387, or $3.80 per person per day on average.  
  These figures expressed in 1995 PPP dollars imply poverty rates that can be 
compared to those based on other data. Table 1 shows that, based on 1996 data, 43 % of all 
Armenians (not just the rural population) were below the poverty line of $2.15 per person 
per day and 75 % were below $4.30 per person per day. This compares to 34 % and 66 % 
respectively in our 1997 sample. Allowing for differences in sampling time, methodology, 
and income calculations, and bearing in mind that the incidence of poverty is lower in rural 
areas in Armenia (see section 3 above), these results are plausible and strengthen confidence 
in the survey findings on incomes and poverty. 
  As the high percentages of people in poverty suggests, average income figures are 
based on large underlying income differences. These are also reflected in the Gini 
coefficient, an inequality measure which moves closer to zero with decreasing inequality. It 
was calculated both on a per capita consumption basis and on a per capita income basis, 
where consumption (comprising both cash expenditures and consumption from in-kind 
income) can be argued to more directly reflect well-being than income (Deaton, 1997). The 
consumption-based Gini coefficient in our rural sample is 0.47, the income-based Gini 
coefficient 0.46
1; this compares to a World Bank nationwide estimate of 0.44 for 1996. 
Income inequality in Armenia is about at the same level as in Russia and Uzbekistan and is 
substantially larger than in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, where the 
income-based Gini coefficient is below 0.40 (WDI, 2002).  
  Poverty has more dimensions than just income. Table 4 illustrates this by presenting 
various measures for well-being and vulnerability, separately for income-poor and non-poor 
households, classified relative to the poverty line of $4.30 per person per day (1995 PPP). 
Income-poor households have lower consumption levels (as measured both by total 
consumption and by cash expenditures). They have more often experienced a crisis in the 
recent past. Their diet quality, reflecting food security considerations, is lower, although on 
average respondents evaluated their diet as not very poor.  
  A households￿ stock of consumption goods also reflects well-being in that it signals 
households￿ ability to survive shocks to their income and is a result of their potential for 
accumulation based on past income (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). In-kind wealth may be 
held both in productive assets, such as land, irrigation systems, livestock, and machinery, and 
in consumption goods. The most important consumption goods in rural Armenia are the 
family home and the food stocks stored by the family for times of need. Two-fifths of 
                                                       
1 Details of the calculation of the Gini coefficients are available on request from the authors.   11 
respondents rate their housing as satisfactory, while over a quarter rate it as poor or very 
poor. Nearly all households (95 %) keep food stores, which in a crisis would last for between 
2 and 3 months on average. These stocks are important for household survival: in an average 
winter month, 55 % of food consumed by the average household comes from their stores, 
half of it produced by the household itself. Table 4 shows that income-poor households 
report lower levels of well-being also by these measures. 
 
Table 4: Average Well-being Indicators: Income-Poor and Non-Poor Households 
Well-being Indicators  Households 
  Poor  (n=942)  Non-poor (n=542)  All (n=1,484) 
      
Annual per-capita consumption (￿000 dram)  46.2  99.9  65.5 
Annual per-capita cash expenditures (￿000 dram)  9.7  11.7  10.6 
Vulnerability to crisis in recent past (%)  47  41  45 
Diet quality (1=excellent, 5=very poor)   3.5  3.1  3.4 
Food store quantity (months)  1-2  3  1-2 
Housing conditions (1=excellent, 5=very poor)  3.3  3.0  3.2 
Notes: All differences between poor and non-poor households are statistically significant for p < 0.01.  
Source: Survey findings. 
 
  Inequality in incomes and consumption is also reflected in inequality in diet quality, 
housing conditions and food stocks. Virtually none of the respondents is well off, and most 
experience a standard of living that is considered only just satisfactory 
 
 
8. Assets, Activities and Poverty  
 
The livelihoods approach suggests that households￿ endowment with capitals and 
involvement in activities matters to the outcome of their livelihood strategies in terms of 
well-being. Table 5 shows how capital endowments and activities are related to a household￿s 
risk of being in poverty. The table draws together from sections 5 and 6 the differences in 
ownership and quality of physical, human, financial and social capital and the differences in 
economic activities between poor and non-poor households, classified relative to the $4.30 
poverty. The table also displays the results of a binary logistic regression that was used to 
estimate the effect of changes in assets and activities on the risk of poverty. Some of the 
variables in Table 5 enter the logistic regression as continuous quantitative regressors. For 
these variables, the first three columns give the means for the entire sample and for the poor 
and non-poor subsamples. Other variables are enter the logistic regression as dichotomous 
regressors with yes/no values. For these variables, the first three columns give the 
frequencies of yes values for the entire sample and for the two poverty-level subsamples. 
  Poor households are shown to have less land, less access to irrigation networks, and 
fewer livestock. They have larger households and relatively more dependants. Since they are 
younger on average, these dependants are typically children rather than elderly people. They 
are better educated (but in a now outdated education system) and have less often access to 
pension payments. They are more often borrowers and seldom savers. They less often 
participate in professional co-operation, less often received help in a recent crisis or expect 
this to happen. The largest relative differences between the poor and the non-poor are in 
financial capital and in access to networks of co-operation and support, less in access to 
physical capital. As to activities, the main finding is that income-poor households less often   12 
access any of the sources of earned income. They more often engage in sale of household 
assets, which plausibly represents a poverty-distress livelihood strategy. 
 
Table 5: Assets, Activities and Poverty 
Variables  Sample means and frequencies  Logistic regression 
results2 (n=1,458) 









       
Location in Ararat valley (yes/no)  27%  26%  29%  0.843 (0.145)  
Physical capital          
Land (hectares)  1.88  1.78 1.90  0.842 (0.037) *** 
Irrigated land (hectares)  0.38  0.35a  0.44 a  0.499 (0.063) *** 
Cattle (head)  0.8  0.7 a 0.9 a  0.312 (0.058) *** 
Using machinery (yes/no)  75%  74%  77%   1.129 (0.176)  
Human capital          
Household size (persons)  4.6  5.0 a 3.9 a  1.410 (0.082) *** 
Average age (years)  35  33 a 41 a  0.976 (0.008) *** 
Dependency ratio (fraction)  0.39  0.41 a 0.36 a  1.004 (0.003)  
Highest education level  (1-5 scale)  2.9  3.0 a 2.8 a  1.063 (0.083)  
Working-age women (% hh size)3  53  53 52  1.010 (0.004) *** 
Pensioner(s) present (yes/no)  51%  48% b 54% b  0.795 (0.149)  
Fnancial capital          
Borrowing  (yes/no)  50%  54% a 43% a  1.370 (0.184) ** 
Savings (yes/no)  10%  5% a 18% a  0.338 (0.075) *** 
Social capital          
Membership in prof. organisation 
(yes/no) 
7% 8% a 5% a 
1.562 (0.447)  
Co-operation (yes/no)  44%  37% a 55% a  0.634 (0.090) *** 
Expects help in crisis (yes/no)  57%  53% a 64% a  0.776 (0.105)  
Activities          
Wage employment (yes/no)  39%  36% a 44% a  0.474 (0.069) *** 
Sale of household assets (yes/no)  18%  21% a 14% a  1.262 (0.229)  
Other farm activities (yes/no)  26%  22% a 33% a  0.803 (0.123)  
Non-farm activities (yes/no)  15%  12% a 18% a  0.665 (0.123) * 
Remittances (yes/no)  20%  15% a 31% a  0.393 (0.063) *** 
        Key regression statistics 
Correctly classified: 74.5%  
LR chi(21): 386.81 
Prob > chi2: 0.000 
Log likelihood:  -689.3751 
Pseudo R2: 0.2191 
Notes:  
1.  Poverty is based on a poverty line of $4.30 per person per day (1995 PPP). The number of poor and 
non-poor reported below are different for different variables, dependent on missing values of these 
variables.  In the comparisons, superscript a denotes differences between poor and non-poor 
households are statistically significant for p<0.01; superscript b indicates significance for p<0.05. 
2.  Logistic maximum likelihood estimation performed in STATA 7.0, modelling the probability of being 
poor. Here * indicates that the regression coefficient underlying the odds ratio is statistically 
significantly different from zero for p<0.10, based on the value of the z-statistic; ** indicates 
significance for p<0.05; *** indicates significance at p<0.01. Further details of the regression 
estimation are available on request from the authors. 
3.  In 179 cases with missing values for female household members, the percentage of women among 
adult household members was imputed by regression. 
 Sources: Survey findings   13 
The results from the logistic regression analysis are most conveniently interpreted in 
terms of odds ratios (or risk ratios), which are defined as the exponentials of the 
corresponding regression coefficients. The percentage change of the risk of being poor due 
to a unit change in a particular explanatory variable (keeping all other variables constant) 
equals the difference of the risk ratio from 1. If the risk ratio is less than 1, increasing the 
explanatory variable by one unit reduces the risk of being poor. Conversely, if the risk ratio 
is greater than 1, increasing the explanatory variable by one unit increases the risk of being 
poor. For binary variables, the risk ratio gives the effect of changing that variable from value 
0 to value 1, i.e. the effect of a change in state. For instance, the risk ratio of irrigated land is 
0.499, which means than one extra hectare of irrigated land reduces the risk of poverty to 50 
% of the risk before the addition of more land. Having a pensioner in the household (risk 
ratio 0.755), reduces the risk of being poor by 25 % compared to households without a 
pensioner, and receiving remittances (risk ratio 0.395) reduces the risk of poverty by 60 % 
compared to households that do not receive remittances.  
  The results on physical capital variables show that land area, and especially irrigated 
land area, as well as livestock ownership all reduce the risk of poverty. Access to machinery, 
counter-intuitively, increases the risk of poverty by 13% (risk ratio 1.129), but the coefficient 
of machinery access is not significant statistically, as is the difference in the percentage of 
households with access to machinery between the poor and the non-poor groups. There is 
also no separate significant effect for natural capital (location in the Ararat Valley), plausibly 
because its positive effect is already captured in physical capital variables, particularly 
irrigated land areas. 
   One human capital effect is that larger households are more at risk of poverty. With 
risk ratio of 1.410 on family size, one extra person in the household increases the risk of 
poverty by 41%. A higher average age (fewer children) and relatively more men also reduce 
poverty risk; but the effect is very small (although statistically significant). Education does 
not have a statistically significant effect on poverty, which is understandable in light of the 
modest difference in educational attainments between the poor and the non-poor, and 
perhaps limited relevance of education in the former system to present income levels. Also 
households with more dependants (keeping the total household size constant) are not 
significantly more at risk of poverty. 
  Among financial capitals, both higher savings and smaller borrowing are significantly 
related to a reduced risk of poverty. In both these cases, however, we have serious causality 
problems. It may in fact be that non-poor households tend to save more and to borrow less. 
The causality thus flows from the household￿s welfare status to savings and borrowings, 
instead of the other way round, as assumed by our model. 
  Social capital as represented by co-operation in professional networks significantly 
reduces the risk of poverty; while formal membership in a professional organisation does 
not. This suggests that relationships supported by regular or continuous interaction are 
especially important for preventing or escaping poverty. An expectation of help in the event 
of calamity is weakly associated with reduced poverty risk. Such reliance on social networks 
is obviously relevant for vulnerability (which relates to discrete, one-time events), but 
apparently less for poverty (which relates to a permanent state). 
  Households￿ involvement in all economic activities, except selling the household 
assets, is poverty risk-reducing, as expected.  This is most significantly (both in the economic 
and statistical sense) the case for remittances and wage employment. Thus, although 
remittances constitute only a small part of total household income on average, they appear   14 
important for keeping rural households out of poverty. The poverty-reducing effect of 
having a non-farm activity is not statistically significant. 
  Overall, the results show that household categories particularly exposed to the risk of 
poverty are those without adequate agricultural assets (such as irrigated land and livestock), 
those with larger families, those unable to save, those left outside networks of professional 





In this study the nature of livelihoods in rural Armenia is explored based on a recent large-
scale household survey. In line with a large body of research on rural diversity, the present 
paper finds that rural households draw their incomes from a range of sources. Most 
important is farming, i.e., food production in the areas of both crops and livestock, which 
generates cash income from sales and in-kind income from own consumption. Wages from 
employment are common as complementary income. Social payments are also important, 
reflecting the damage recently done to Armenia￿s rural economy by economic and political 
disintegration, war, earthquake, and drought. In line with other empirical literature, there is 
evidence of a high incidence of poverty and large income inequality. Rural Armenians cope 
by diversifying their portfolio of activities, by pooling financial resources, and by relying on 
co-operation in economic activities and on mutual aid in the event of a calamity. 
  We find evidence that access to the various forms of capital and involvement in 
various economic activities are linked to the risk of poverty. The rural poor in Armenia have 
generally lower quantities and qualities of physical, human, financial, and social capital. In 
particular, they have fewer agricultural assets, are unable to save and do not access networks 
of professional co-operation. They also derive less of their income from each of the separate 
categories of economic activities, and more from social payments and sale of their assets. 
Their lower incomes are consistently reflected in other measures for well-being including 
consumption, satisfaction of basic needs, and vulnerability to crises. 
  In view of this reality, poverty alleviation policies should include three elements. 
First, households￿ access to resources for food production should be secured. In this respect 
the 1991 land reform was very effective in combating deeper poverty than is already 
observed. It could be complemented by a more effective farm support systems in terms of 
extension, credit, marketing, and producer co-operation. 
  Culturally appropriate forms of social capital also appear to have the potential to aid 
rural income generation and reduce vulnerability to income shocks. Support to local NGOs, 
credit unions, producer organizations, water use associations, churches, and other groups 
may have positive effects on the income generating capacity of their members and, through 
production linkages, on the wider local economy. 
Finally, wage employment is an important source of income, and a direct gain to 
poor households would be generated by widening opportunities for employment in rural 
commerce, services, and industry. This would give many, and particularly the poorer 
households, the option to improve their incomes. Support for, and expansion of, other rural 
non-agricultural activities such as small-scale enterprises would also be beneficial to the 
livelihoods of the poor, who are most involved in the rural non-agricultural economy. 
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